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Abstract 
During the last 50 years, the Lower Jordan river basin experienced a rapid and comprehensive 
process of development of its rare water resources. This led to its progressive closure: almost 
no water is left to be mobilized and used while demand, notably in urban areas, keeps 
increasing. Despite the need to give priority to demand management options to alleviate the 
Jordanian water crisis, the potential of these options appears limited in the mid-run; the 
growing demand of the population and the sustaining of agriculture are unlikely to be met 
without supply augmentation measures which will reopen the basin. 
Introduction 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (THKJ) is one of the countries with the scarcest water 
resources in the world. Due to both physical water scarcity and a high demographic growth 
during most of the second half of the twentieth century it has been estimated that the per 
capita endowment of renewable blue water (i.e., surface runoff plus groundwater recharge) is 
now only 163 cubic meters per year (m3/yr), while the average domestic consumption is 94 
liters per capita and per day nationwide (THKJ, 2004). The water resources available in the 
Jordanian part of the Lower Jordan river basin (LJRB, see figure 2) are currently renewed at a 
rate of 705 million cubic meters per year (Mm3/yr), including 155 Mm3/yr of groundwater 
and 550 Mm3/yr of surface water. The total water withdrawn within the basin amounts to 585 
Mm3/yr, i.e., 83% of the renewable surface water and groundwater, but this value obscures 
the critical overdraft of the main aquifers (Courcier et al., 2005). 
The LJRB is a region of prime importance for the country: it includes 83% of the total 
population, most of the main industries and 80% of its irrigated agriculture. It is endowed 
with 80% of the country's water resources and uses 75% of these. During the last 50 years, 
this basin has experienced a rapid and comprehensive process of mobilization of its rare water 
resources that has led to its progressive closure: almost no water is left to be mobilized and 
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used while demand, notably in urban areas, keeps increasing. Water users and economic 
sectors are competing for the same rare, yet, quantitatively and qualitatively decreasing water 
resources. 
The main interactions and water allocation problems in the LJRB are schematized in figure 1. 
Amman (and other cities) are supplied with water coming from the Jordan valley, aquifers, 
and imports from outer basins. To meet the growing water demand, there is a need to a) 
improve inflow from the Yarmouk river (dam), b) transfer more water from the valley to 
Amman (hence reducing agricultural use, although treated wastewater [TTW] is sent back to 
the valley), c) reduce abstraction from aquifers by highland agriculture in order to preserve 
water quality, avoid overdraft and reallocate water to cities, and d) rely on (costly) imports 
from other basins as little as possible. 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of main water flows in the LJRB. 
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This article describes the closure of a river basin in an arid region. After sketching out the 
context, it identifies some key driving forces of this closure and quantifies the transformations 
that occurred. Finally, it highlights the problems faced by the water and agricultural sectors in 
Jordan, presents options to meet the growing demand of the basin, identifies the problems that 
future policies may encounter during their implementation, and discusses the scope for 
reopening the basin. 
Main Features of the Lower Jordan River Basin in Jordan 
The Jordan river is an international river which drains a total area of about 18,000 km² 
pertaining to five countries: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine (the West Bank). Its 
three headwater tributaries originate from Lebanon and flow southward into Lake Tiberius 
(cf. figure 2). With the outflow of the Jordan river from Lake Tiberius virtually blocked by 
Israel, the lower Jordan river in Jordan on which this study focuses chiefly receives the water 
from its main tributary, the Yarmouk river (cf. figures 2 and 4). The LJRB represents 40% of 
the entire Jordan river basin but only 7.8% of Jordan's territory. Nonetheless, irrigated 
agriculture, which uses 70% of the national water resources, is also mainly concentrated in the 
basin. From west to east, the LJRB is divided in two main areas: the Jordan valley and the 
remaining part referred to by the term highlands. 
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Figure 2. The LJRB in Jordan. 
  
The highlands are composed of a mountain range (uplands) running alongside the Jordan 
valley and of a desert plateau extending easterly to Syria and Iraq. The mountains are mostly 
composed of rangelands, with occasional olive trees and stone-fruit trees. The plateau has an 
average altitude of 600 m and is mainly used to grow cereals near the mountains, where main 
urban areas are concentrated and where rainfall is still sufficient for rain-fed agriculture. 
Eastward, precipitations become scarcer and only nomadic Bedouin livestock farming can be 
found, with a few localized plots of groundwater-based irrigated agriculture. 
The Jordan valley is a 130-km stretch between the Yarmouk river in the north and the Dead 
Sea in the south. Its altitude varies from 200 m (in the north) to 400 m (in the south) below 
sea level, and its climate is semiarid in the north and arid in the south. Agriculture is possible 
thanks to pressurized networks fed by a canal and irrigating 20,000 hectares. 
Drivers of the Closure of the LJRB 
Prior to water resources development, the original flow of the Jordan river into the Dead Sea 
varied between 1,100 and 1,400 Mm3/yr (Klein, 1998; Al-Weshah, 2000). Half of this volume 
was coming from the upper Jordan river through Lake Tiberius but is now diverted by Israel 
to its National Water Carrier. The Yarmouk and the Zarqa rivers are now the two main 
contributors to surface water resources in the LJRB. Several temporary streams of lesser 
importance named ‘side-wadis’ also incise the two mountainous banks and feed the lower 
Jordan river (cf. figure 4). Groundwater resources originate from four main groundwater 
basins, namely the Amman-Zarqa, the Yarmouk, the side-wadis and the Jordan valley basins. 
A qualitative and quantitative assessment of the history of water resources development and 
use within the LJRB illustrates the gradual “artificialization” of this river basin from a 
situation around 1950 where only 10,000 hectares were irrigated, groundwater was untapped, 
and abundant freshwater flowed to the Dead Sea (cf. figure 4) to the current situation where 
46,000 hectares are irrigated, nearly all surface water resources are tapped and committed, 
groundwater is being severely mined, with only little water reaching the Dead Sea, and a 
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saline sink that is the final outlet of the Jordan river (cf. figure 5).5 Both endogenous and 
exogenous reasons can explain the increasing pressure on available water resources 
undergone by the LJRB during the last 50 years (see more details in Courcier et al., 2005). 
Figure 3. Water resources development in the LJRB around 1950.  
 
 
   Source: Courcier et al., 2005. 
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First, the increasing development of water uses in the upper Jordan (diversion of the river 
flow by Israel through its National Water Carrier) and the upper Yarmouk by Syria has led to 
a decrease of the total inflow (rainfall included) into the LJRB from 3,300 to 2,600 Mm3/yr 
between the 1950s and the 2000s. 
Second, a high population growth (the Jordanian population has increased more than 
twelvefold since 1948) linked to both a high natural growth rate (2.4% per year) and 
successive waves of migrations,6  and the strong development of urban areas such as Amman-
Zarqa along with improving living standards have led to an increasing water demand. 
Despite a high degree of infrastructural development (cf. figure 5), these two trends 
inexorably led to a sharp decrease of the per capita water availability: estimated at 3,600 m3 in 
1946, the renewable blue water per capita and per year decreased to 163 m3 around 2000 and 
is expected to further decrease down to 90 m3 in 2025. 
Water supply in the cities expanded through the development of public wells in and around 
urban areas and through water transfers for neighboring aquifers (cf. figure 5), with no regard 
for the unsustainability of these practices in the long term. In the 2000s, municipal and 
industrial abstraction amounts to 205 Mm3/yr (i.e., 31% of current withdrawals), against 10 
Mm3/yr in the early 1950s. 
Third, irrigated agriculture was promoted, based on social (integrating Palestinian refugee 
population), political (promoting stability in the Middle East after the creation of Israel) and 
economic (enhancing Jordan's development) objectives. It is now the main user of the 
country’s scarce resources. 
o Large-scale public irrigation was introduced in the Jordan valley through the 
construction, between 1958 and 1966, of a main 69-km-long concrete canal (the King 
Abdullah Canal-KAC) which parallels the river on its eastern bank (cf. figure 5). In 
1962, a land reform led to the formation of thousands of small intensive farms and to the 
settlement of numerous families, including Palestinian refugees, in the valley (Khouri, 
1981; Van Aken, 2004). Irrigation facilities were then improved and extended by the 
government: irrigated agriculture had its heyday in the 1980s and early 1990s when 
modern irrigation and cropping techniques (greenhouses, drip irrigation, plastic mulch, 
fertilizer, new varieties, etc.), together with cheap labor from Egypt, became widely 
available. In the 2000s, about 185 Mm3/yr were used in the Jordan valley (cf. figure 4). 
o In the highlands, several governmental projects aimed at settling Bedouins were 
implemented in the 1960s: land was irrigated by public deep wells managed by a public 
authority. Although these projects, focused on subsistence and fodder crops, seem to 
have failed in most cases, many Bedouins took up the idea during the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, drilled their own wells and engaged in private irrigation, dramatically 
depleting groundwater resources. 
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Much of the traditional agricultural-cum-livestock model of the nomadic Bedouins was 
replaced by a modern intensive market-oriented agriculture which expanded both in the 
Jordan valley and in the highlands. Small-to-medium entrepreneurial farmers supplied 
growing cities and exported their surplus around the Middle East. This phenomenon described 
by Elmusa (1994) as the “Super Green Revolution” significantly contributed to the economic 
development of Jordan during the 1980s but led to a critically unsustainable use of the 
country’s water resources. 
Around 2000, total renewable blue water has been evaluated at 705 Mm3/yr (550 Mm3/yr of 
surface runoff and 155 Mm3/yr of groundwater recharge; THKJ 2004; Courcier et al., 2005). 
Total water withdrawals in the basin reached 585 Mm3/yr (i.e., 83% of the renewable surface 
water and groundwater), including 275 Mm3/yr in groundwater abstraction (i.e., a gross 
overdraft of the aquifers of 120 Mm3/yr), and 310 Mm3/yr of surface water diversion 
(including 60 Mm3/yr of treated wastewater). In addition, each year, the basin also imports 30 
Mm3 of groundwater and 45 Mm3 of surface water from outer basins (cf. figure 5). 
Uncontrolled flows to the Dead Sea are as low as 315 Mm3/yr (cf. figure 5). 
Agricultural abstraction accounts for 79% of the total withdrawals in the LJRB (455 Mm3/yr) 
and irrigated agriculture competes with the municipal and industrial sectors as it jeopardizes 
future low-cost uses of the Jordanian aquifers for domestic purposes. Irrigated agriculture is 
indeed one of the main activities responsible for the current dramatic over-depletion of the 
basin’s aquifers: according to the records of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, agricultural 
groundwater abstraction in the LJRB reached 121 Mm3/yr in 2004. 
The LJRB is a closed basin where there are no uncommitted outflows except when the 
Yarmouk river is in spate and flows exceed diversion capacity. Both the Jordan valley and the 
highlands, on the one hand, and agriculture and cities, on the other, are interconnected and 
interdependent. Spatial interconnectedness of uses and flows can be sensed from figure 5. 
This interdependence means that, under a scenario with no interbasin transfers, urban water 
needs will have to be covered through more transfer from agriculture and that competition for 
groundwater can only be alleviated, if not remedied, by a decrease of irrigated areas in the 
highlands. It also means that there is no slack in the system and that the brunt of hydrologic 
fluctuations and supply uncertainty will have to be borne by agriculture. 
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Figure 4. Water resources and uses in the LJRB around 2000.  
 
       Source: Courcier et al., 2005. 
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Changing components of the water accounting 
This qualitative description of the transformation of the LJRB can be paralleled by a 
quantitative accounting of the (im)balance between supply and demand. This water 
accounting draws on the categories of water balance proposed by Molden (1997). We first 
give a detailed accounting of the water flows in 2000 (current situation) and then describe the 
historical changes in the components of the water balance. 
We considered here that there is no commitment of the water entering the Dead Sea, which is, 
therefore considered as a sink. Accounting for the environmental flow needed to maintain the 
level of the Dead Sea as a “commitment” would actually distort our water balances to the 
point of rendering it meaningless. This would point to an extreme overcommitment since the 
basin has been having a deficit of around 540 Mm3/yr since the early 1950s (figure 5). Based 
on the definition of water depletion as the use or removal of water from a water basin that 
renders it unavailable for further uses (Molden, 1997), the LJRB consumed 86% of its net 
inflow (i.e., rainfall, interbasin transfers, and lateral groundwater flows) through evaporation 
and evapotranspiration in 2000. The only flows reaching the Dead sea are coming 
(uncontrolled) from the upper Yarmouk basin (110 Mm3), the upper Jordan (10 Mm3), return 
flows from irrigated areas (70 Mm3) and excess or uncontrolled flows from canals and side-
wadis (125 Mm3) (cf. figure 5). Further, beneficial depletion (irrigation, rain-fed agriculture, 
industrial and drinking uses) accounts for 33% of the net inflow, low beneficial depletion 
(natural vegetation) for 15% and non-beneficial depletion (through bare land evaporation) for 
38% of it. The remaining 14% flows into the Dead Sea. 
Most of the depletion takes place in desert areas (44% of the total water depleted in the 
LJRB). Evaporation in irrigated fields accounts for 18% of the total depletion, as much as the 
depleted volumes through either rain-fed agriculture or natural vegetation, despite their much 
smaller areas (cf. table 1). Finally, despite all the allocation conflicts between cities and 
agriculture, the share of municipal and industrial uses is negligible, representing only 3% of 
the total depleted fraction in the LJRB (not shown). 
From a situation in the 1950s when few of the surface water and groundwater resources were 
put into use, to the current situation of overexploitation, the terms of the water balance have 
varied sharply. Table 1 summarizes main indicators of water mobilization and uses in the 
LJRB and their evolution during the 1950-2000 period with some projections for 2025. 
The first notable evolution is that of land use. Irrigated areas increased more than fourfold 
between 1950 and 2000. This total area (including both schemes in the valley and 
groundwater-based agriculture in the highlands) is projected to decrease by 10% in the next 
quarter century. Rain-fed cropping areas have significantly increased in the 1950-1975 period, 
when cereals provided work and food to a growing population. This extensive type of 
agriculture later declined, with the growing influence of urban areas and a shift towards 
nonagricultural activities. The natural vegetation contracted and expanded in opposition with 
these changes. 
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Table 1. Indicators of mobilization and water uses (Mm3/yr) in the LJRB and their evolution during the period 
1950-2025 (adapted from Courcier et al., 2005). 
 1950 1975 2000 2025 
Net inflow 3,278 2,635 2,605 2,598
Renewable blue water 1,588 823 705 861
Controlled renewable blue water 493 543 545 806
Groundwater abstraction 6 110 275 255
Total withdrawals (with imports) 101 316 660 967
Total outflow to the Dead Sea 1,295 505 315 200
Total withdrawals 
(% of renewable blue water) 
6 38 94 112
Total withdrawals 
(% of controlled renewable blue water) 
20 58 121 120
Volume of withdrawals depleted 54 202 474 705
Volume of withdrawals depleted 
(% of renewable blue water) 
3 24 67 82
Volume of withdrawals depleted 
(% of controlled renewable blue water) 
11 37 87 87
Depletion-irrigation (% of total depletion) 4 11 18 15
Depletion-rain-fed agriculture (% of total depletion) 17 26 18 18
Depletion-natural vegetation (% of total depletion) 26 18 17 19
Beneficial depletion 391 756 867 945
Total depletion 1,893 2,054 2,235 2,398
Natural vegetation (ha) 145,400 118,850 114,200 122,900
Rain-fed crops area (ha) 271,200 334,900 260,600 269,300
Irrigated area (ha) 10,250 24,900 45,800 37,400
With only 315 Mm3 reaching the Dead Sea every year, the deficit in inflow resulted in a 
gradual and constant drop in the water level of the inland sea. Deducting rainfall directly 
evaporated from crop and bare soils, the renewable blue water shows a drop by 56% with a 
slump at 705 Mm3 in 2000 and a subsequent increase by 23% projected for 2025, because of 
water imports. The controllable renewable blue water is significantly lower (545 Mm3) since 
uncontrolled and brackish flows from the Yarmouk, side-wadis or Israel are discounted. The 
expected increase in 2025 mirrors the imports and the larger share of the Yarmouk flow 
stored in the Wehdah dam (cf. below). Strikingly, withdrawals now amount to 121% of the 
controlled renewable blue water (i.e., 660 Mm3/yr) because of groundwater overabstraction 
and multiple diversions (return flows from wadi-irrigation or from Amman are reused 
downstream in the south of the Jordan valley). 
Aquifers began to be overexploited during the last quarter century and the net overdraft is 
now reaching 32 Mm3/yr. Figure 6 gives the evolution of the depleted fraction distributed 
over three categories (process/beneficial, low-beneficial, and non-beneficial). 
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The biggest changes occurred in the 1950-1975 period when total beneficial depletion 
increased dramatically from 391 to 756 Mm3/yr (or from 21 to 37% of the total depleted 
fraction) and the total depletion from 58 to 78% of the net inflow. This happened because 
cultivated areas increased and the net inflow was curtailed by the diversion of the upper 
Jordan river by Israel. This trend continued in the last quarter century and took the beneficial 
depleted fraction to 39% of total depletion in the basin in the 2000s (867 Mm3/yr; partly due 
to the overexploitation of the aquifers). At the same time, the total depleted fraction increased 
to 86% of the net inflow and will continue to increase up to 92% in the next 25 years; only 
8% of the inflow will reach the Dead Sea (not considering volumes possibly transferred to the 
Dead Sea by the Red-Dead canal; cf. below). 
Figure 5. Evolution of depleted fractions in the LJRB (nominal values and percentage). 
 
   Source: Courcier et al., 2005. 
Non-beneficial and low-beneficial depleted fractions stayed (and will remain) roughly 
constant since 1950, while their relative share continuously decreased because of the 
expansion of the cropped area (both rain-fed and irrigated) contributing to raising the 
beneficial depleted fraction. Further, irrigation depletion dramatically increased from 2% of 
the net inflow in 1950 to around 18% at present (making up 45% of the beneficial depleted 
fraction). Again, these values are expected to decline, under the assumption that highland 
irrigated agriculture is to be reduced and that more water is to be imported to cities. Finally, 
overall efficiency of water use in the basin, considered as a system and expressed both in 
percentage of renewable blue water or in percentage of controlled renewable water, has 
sharply increased and reaches 67 and 87%, respectively (cf. table 1). These values are 
expected to reach 82 and 87% in 2025. 
This underlines the fact that the LJRB is a closed basin where almost no water is left to be 
mobilized and used. In other words, there are very limited prospects to alleviate the Jordanian 
water crisis by technical improvement aiming at increasing water use efficiency (the ratio of 
depleted water to water withdrawals reaches 72%). 
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Reopening the LJRB: Demand management vs. supply augmentation options? 
The exploitation of water resources increased sharply between 1975 and 1995 but little 
change was apparent in the way water resources were managed even if, in the beginning of 
the 1990s, awareness of a “water crisis” was developing among the users. Until the mid- 
1990s, water was largely considered as a “sleeping resource” to be found and mobilized by 
ever-effective and efficient new techniques. The mid-1990s marked a turning point: a more 
comprehensive hydrological knowledge and the 1994 Peace treaty that fixed the repartition of 
water resources between Israel and Jordan put the water crisis faced by these countries in 
sharp relief. 
The Jordanian government is engaged in a critical reorientation of its water policy. The 
publication of Jordan's water strategy and policies in 1997 (THKJ & MWI, 1997), the 
creation in 1992 of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation responsible for the management of 
the entire water sector, the publication of several World Bank reports (World Bank, 2001a, 
2001b), the official issuance of a national water master plan (THKJ, 2004), all called for 
implementing effective demand management options (notably through a reduction of the 
agricultural water consumption and a better management of urban water supplies) that would 
displace traditional supply augmentation options (Al-Jayyousi, 2000). This orientation was 
forcefully endorsed by bilateral cooperation partners such as GTZ (Magiera et al., 2006), 
USAID and CIDA/IDRC (http://www.idrc.ca/waterdemand/). Actions taken to manage the 
actual demand included: 
• Freezing of well-drilling authorizations in 1992. 
• Implementation of a tax of US$0.35/m3 for any water pumped and sold/used for 
industrial or aesthetic purposes (since 1994) as well as domestic purposes (since 
2002). 
• Metering of agricultural groundwater abstraction and the controversial establishment 
of a tax on the volumes pumped over a given threshold to preserve the quality of the 
main Jordanian aquifers (THKJ, 2002, 2004a; Chebaane et al., 2004; Venot & Molle, 
2006). 
• A reduction—reflecting water availability—of the quotas allocated to farmers and 
government payments to farmers for fallowing their land in the valley during droughts.  
• Modernization of irrigation systems and different measures to improve irrigation 
efficiency. 
• Recommendation to increase irrigation water charges in the valley (THKJ & MWI, 
1997, 1998, 2004b; World Bank 2003; USAID 2006). 
• Recycling of water through an increasing use of treated wastewater in the south of the 
Jordan valley (McCornick et al., 2001, 2002; THKJ et al., 2002; Scott et al., 2003). 
• Rehabilitation of the Greater-Amman supply network to improve distribution and 
reduce unaccounted for water (Decker, 2004). 
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• Transfer of the management of urban water supply to the Amman city to a private 
company (Suleiman, 2002; Darmane, 2004). 
• Increasing reallocation of water from agriculture to urban uses (around 2000s, 50 
Mm3/yr are pumped in the Jordan valley and transferred to Amman; this quantity is 
expected to increase to 90 Mm3/yr at the 2025 horizon; Courcier et al., 2005). 
• Promotion of efficient use of water resources through agriculture focused on removal 
of subsidies, lifting of price controls, liberalization of the external trade regime, and 
deregulation of the land market in the Jordan valley which were part of the ASAL 
(agriculture sector structural adjustment loan) World Bank loan  (Pitman, 2004). 
Whether significant regional water savings can be achieved through demand management 
options is doubtful: Venot & Molle (2006) have shown that despite the hope vested in water 
pricing strategies, little reduction of agricultural water use would be achieved through such 
measures (on the other hand, recovering O&M costs is achievable in the Jordan valley). 
Pricing policies were both expected to take groundwater abstraction rates close to the annual 
recharge by the year 2005 (Pitman, 2004), and to reduce agricultural diversion in the Jordan 
valley (World Bank, 2003). However, in line with Berkoff (1994) who recognized ‘that it is 
inconceivable that [charges] would be high enough to balance supply and demand,’ a World 
Bank (2003) report indeed acknowledged indeed that ‘it was anticipated that increased water 
tariffs would reduce agricultural water use. This did not happen.’ 
The water and agriculture sectors face a complex set of social, technical and economical 
problems. Irrigated agriculture competes with domestic water use not so much in terms of 
present allocation (water is already reallocated from agriculture in the Jordan valley to the 
M&I sector in Amman; cf. figure 5) but, rather, in terms of future use, since the current 
groundwater overdraft in the highlands reduces water availability for future urban uses. In 
addition, the aquifer gets increasingly saline with depth and this salinity is compounded by 
the use of fertilizers and pesticides; this implies that more costly alternative sources will have 
to be tapped in the near future. 
Irrigated agriculture in the highlands includes intensive olive trees, fruit-tree plantations and 
open-field vegetable cultivation. It is unlikely that irrigation efficiency can be significantly 
improved because olive trees are already under-irrigated, efficiency in fruit-tree orchards is 
already high and vegetables have low returns: improving efficiency would require investment 
in technology and qualified labor that are a) higher than gains resulting from a reduced water 
bill and b) beyond the capacity of most of these farmers, many of whom are indebted. A 
substantial drop in water abstraction can only be obtained through the diminution of either the 
cultivated area or the number of wells in use. This can be achieved by negative incentives 
(higher tariffs, petrol taxation, stricter enforcement of abstraction limits) but recent political 
crises suggest that these are unlikely to be accepted without attendant positive incentives, 
such as buying-out of wells (a measure envisaged by the government and considered 
positively by 50% of farmers; Chebaane et al., 2004), compensation for the uprooting of olive 
trees in the eastern desert (Fitch, 2001), and substituting treated wastewater for groundwater 
(Shaner, 2001). 
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In the valley, improved efficiency will come from better canal management (after the Wehdah 
dam allows storage and fine-tuning of releases), possible improvements in collective 
pressurized networks and upgrading of individual plot-level equipment: however, the scope 
for saving water is limited to certain periods (when requirements are lower than supply or 
quotas) and by uncertainty about the soil salinity problems which may arise if salt lixiviation 
is reduced (McCornick et al., 2001). Existing differential quotas between banana, citrus and 
vegetable growers may also result in economic efficiencies if they protect extensive and low- 
value crops and hinder intensification. It is already clear that freshwater will be increasingly 
transferred to Amman and that the valley will have to use a growing share of treated 
wastewater. 
Irrigated agriculture is now the residual user of water and is increasingly vulnerable to 
drought. It does not enjoy anymore the very favorable conditions of the 1970s and the 1980s 
and is affected by changes in relative competitiveness with regard to other regional producers 
and by changes in market prices. Due to its limited importance for the national economy (5% 
of the labor force; 3 to 4% of the GDP) its future is uncertain. Preserving a local production of 
fruits and vegetables to supply the large local market, stabilizing the trade balance (12% of 
Jordanian exports are fruits and vegetables) and insuring a certain level of revenue to farmers 
remain important objectives. However, policies may be needed to phase out segments of the 
agriculture sector which consumes water-scarce resources while yielding relatively low 
benefits: olive trees in desert areas of the highlands (which total half of the highland irrigated 
area and deplete one-fourth of the total groundwater abstracted for agricultural purposes), 
citrus orchards in the valley and, to a lesser extent, bananas also in the valley, whose return is 
partly due to protective customs duties (see Venot & Molle, 2006 for more details). 
Such evolutions are constrained by two separate factors: The first one is political and relates 
to the political clout of some Bedouin tribes and landowners both in the highlands and the 
valley who have resisted water pricing policies that would have constrained their use of water 
or their income (Pitman, 2004). The second factor is the social necessity of balancing family 
farming and agro-business, social stability and economic efficiency. As a rule, state policies 
include investments/subsidies to allow modernization of family farms in order to better 
compete with highly capitalized operators. Even in Europe this necessity is crucial and recent 
simulation of the response of European agriculture to the European Water Directive 
Framework showed a need for a distinction between "socially driven irrigation" and 
"commercial systems" (Berbel et al., 2005). 
Despite political priority and emphasis placed on demand management policies, supply 
augmentation projects have been pursued, including interbasin transfers of desalinized water 
from the Maïn springs and Mujib wadi, south of the LJRB and the ongoing construction of the 
Wehdah dam. The mid- and long-term solutions presently envisioned are eventually typical 
capital- and technology-intensive supply augmentation projects, including the transfer to 
Amman of the water of the Disi aquifer used by both Jordan and Saudi Arabia mainly for 
irrigation. But the epitome of these planned technical solutions is the project of transferring 
1,500 Mm3/yr of seawater from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, desalinating part of it to meet 
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urban water needs (this project would, in the long run, increase, by one half, the total 
available freshwater in Jordan) and countering the historical decline of the Dead Sea level (cf. 
figure 7). 
Figure 6. Projected situation of water use patterns in the LJRB by the mid-2020s.  
 
  Source: Courcier et al., 2005. 
This may be seen as the lasting dominance of the engineering-based approach but this also 
shows that however desirable they may be, demand-management options may only alleviate 
the actual situation without providing long-term solutions. This does not mean that fine-
tuning of irrigation supply in the valley or further adoption of water saving technology does 
not need to be considered, but it does set a drastic limit to what can be achieved through 
conservation means. Just as in other water-stressed environments (as in the case of California 
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described by Turral 1998), basin closure means that overall basin efficiency is close to 
maximum and that all options (conservation, recycling, reallocation, interbasin transfers) must 
generally be pursued together. In the present case, this suggests that transfers may well be 
needed in the future, although this conclusion should not be taken as a justification for 
disregarding short-term demand management options. 
Conclusion 
This article illustrates the gradual “anthropogenization” of a river basin over a time span of 50 
years. The process of closure has been very rapid and mainly driven by three processes which 
put ever-increasing pressure on the rare available water resources of the basin: increasing 
water diversions in the upstream basin, a high population growth and a rapid development of 
both irrigated agriculture and cities. At present, the LJRB is a closed basin, water resources 
are overcommitted, and no resources are left to be mobilized and used. Because of the reuse 
of water and of the current groundwater overdraft, withdrawals amount to 121% of 
controllable blue water. Considering the sustaining of the Dead Sea level as an objective, 
rather than taking the Dead Sea as a sink, would point to even more dramatic overuse. 
Such basin closure means that all uses are increasingly interdependent, through a complex 
web of natural flows, diversions and return flows. This tight interdependence and the limited 
basin outflow also mean that growing urban needs will have to be covered through 
reallocation of water away from agriculture or from interbasin transfers. With little slack in 
the system, hydrologic vagaries will primarily affect agriculture and contingency plans must 
be prepared in advance in order to avoid crises. 
Finally, the relatively high water use efficiency, the limited losses through percolation and the 
costs of adopting high-tech equipment signal that the scope for water savings both at the local 
and basin scales is more limited than often believed. A ceiling has been reached: demand-
management options must be pursued aggressively and may alleviate the actual situation but 
they may not bring long-term solutions that will eventually be provided by supply 
augmentation projects (interbasin transfers, desalinization). Although such projects implicitly 
negate the policy emphasis put on demand management and may be taken as a sign of the 
enduring priority given to capital-intensive projects, they may also signal that reopening river 
basins through water transfers and desalinization, as also observed in Israel, might become a 
common characteristic of the evolution of river basins in arid countries. 
 
Notes 
1 Most of the conclusions presented in this paper are derived from Courcier et al. (2005) and Venot & Molle (2006). This 
research was supported by a grant from the Government of the Netherlands to the Comprehensive Assessment and by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. 
2 PhD Scholar at the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Hyderabad, India and at the Laboratoire Gecko, 
University of Paris X-Nanterre. j.venot@cgiar.org
3 Senior researcher at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, 911 Avenue Agropolis, 34000 Montpellier, France; 
joint appointment with the International Water management Institute. f.molle@cgiar.org
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4 Formerly head of the MREA (French Regional Mission for Water and Agriculture) of the French Embassy in Amman, 
Jordan.  
5 This view considers the Dead Sea as a sink; current flows are so much under "natural" flows that there is no way 
environmental sustainability of the Dead Sea can be factored in as a policy objective under current circumstances (unless 
seawater is transferred from the Red Sea). 
6 Jordan underwent successive waves of migrants due to the wider political situation in the Middle East: 350,000 Palestinian 
refugees after the 1948-1949 Israeli-Arab war; 405,000 persons after the 6-day war of 1967; 635,000 persons between 1988 
and 1992 (after the abandonment of any administrative relations with the west bank in 1988 and the Gulf crisis of 1990/91). It 
is estimated that further 500,000 persons (mainly Iraqis) have fled the Gulf for Jordan after the second gulf war of 2003. The 
population of Jordan was estimated at 5.35 millions in 2004 (Pre-1948 population was about 430,000 persons).  
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